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ATTACKING BANANAS AND
DEFENDING ENVIRONMENTAL
COMMON LAW
Denise Antolinit
In the Monty Python skit "Self-Defense Against Fresh Fruit,"
Sergeant Major John Cleese instructs his feckless recruits on how to
react to the risk of attack by someone armed with fresh fruit.' He
starts by demonstrating how to defend against an attacker rushing at
him with a banana. Cleese intones: "First of all, you force him to drop
the banana; then, second, you eat the banana, thus disarming him.
You have now rendered him 'elpless." Then, after egging on a recruit
to attack him with a banana, Cleese pulls out a gun, shoots the
attacker, then eats the banana. When a dismayed fellow recruit
queries, "Suppose I'm attacked by a man with a banana and I haven't
got a gun?," Cleese deadpans: "Run for it."
Stuart Buck's article "The Common Law & The Environment in
the Courts" reminds me of the flawed logic so hilariously portrayed in
this Monty Python skit. By suggesting the straw man argument that
common law remedies are offered as a complete substitute for
statutory approaches to solving modem environmental problems,
Buck is wildly shooting at imaginary bananas. No modem
commentator that I know of has suggested that the common law
should replace our well-developed network of statutory laws that
address environmental problems. 2 Supplement, yes, but not replace.
Yet, Buck insists, "if some common law advocates got their wish,
t Associate Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of
Hawaii at Manoa.
I Monty Python's Flying Circus, Self-Defense Against Fresh Fruit (BBC1 television
broadcast October 26, 1969).
2 Buck seems to set up Professor Bill Rodgers as this would-be extremist by quoting his
treatise's praise for the virtues of nuisance law, but Rodgers himself goes on to describe
nuisance as the "backbone" not a substitute for modem statutory environmental law. Stuart
Buck, The Common Law & The Environment in the Courts, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 621
(2008).
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regulatory agencies would apparently be replaced (entirely?) by
common law action."3 Entirely? Really?
By setting up the extreme, Buck makes sensible common law
advocates looks ridiculous. Yet, the fallacious premise makes for an
unsatisfying analysis of the serious questions regarding the pros and
cons of the common law in today's complex environmental litigation
landscape. Buck fails to recognize the well-accepted value of
common law in the modem statutory era as an interstitial remedy.
And, he ignores (deliberately?) the less-well-accepted but equally
obvious current use of common law litigation as a catalyst for policy
change. These two fundamental values of "environmental common
law" litigation-interstitial and catalytic-are, unfortunately, wholly
ignored in his essay but of significant value in the real world of
environmental advocacy.
The weakness in Buck's premise becomes most evident in his
conclusion where he admits he has to "equivocate" and acknowledges
that courts "are good" at addressing certain kinds of disputes and that,
"[a]s to such disputes, the common law can be a useful regulatory
tool. ' 4 He still challenges the utility of the common law, however,
because "we don't really know very much about how much
environmental protection the common law independently could
provide, and we have reason to be skeptical that the right sorts of
cases will percolate into the judicial system for resolution. 5 Without
offering what might ever be, in his view, that "right sort of case," he
points to what he considers a bad case-a "diffuse, low-probability,
multi-lateral, and temporally remote harms" that the courts "aren't the
best" at addressing.6 This example is clearly bothering him, indeed,
perhaps it is the very reason he wrote the essay: it is "global
warming."
7
Thus, it seems that Buck's essay is really not about the weaknesses
of the common law in general (and there are indeed many) but rather
a specific attack on the merits of the most recent innovative (catalytic)
uses of the common law in context of the U.S. policy debate over a
federal response to global climate change. Whether Buck's objections
are truly jurisprudential or simply climate-skeptical, his provocative
3 Id at 644. Buck sets up a caricature of common law advocates: "But do we have reason
to believe that courts should be the only governmental vehicles for setting wide-ranging social
policy as to environmental law?" Id. (emphasis in original). What is missing from his
provocative point here and elsewhere in the essay is a citation to a source who may have stated
the utility of the common law in such a radical and unrealistic way.
4 Id. at 646.
5 Id. (emphasis added).
6 Id.
7 Buck, supra note 2, at 646.
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essay provides a good reason to review how modem-day
environmental practitioners are using the common law and the courts
to work around the infirmities of unresponsive statutory schemes in
the face of continuing and growing environmental problems.
As a co-editor of a recent book suggesting that the common law
does have a useful role to play even in the highly developed statutory
context of environmental law,8 I obviously have a divergent view
from Buck. In Creative Common Law Strategies for Protecting the
Environment, my co-editor Cliff Rechtshaffen and I deliberately set
about collecting the stories from current practitioners who are actively
using the common law to address a wide variety of environmental
problems that have been ignored by the political process. From
contamination of groundwater by MTBE in California, and polluting
factory farms in the Midwest, to large agricultural landowners freely
diverting water from taro famers in Hawaii, the major cases today
invoking common law remedies have a shared theme: the
community's frustration with the lack of legislative solutions to
persistent environmental crises. As Professor Joseph Sax explains in
the Preface of our book, the collection of stories written by these
practitioners about their cases is "cause for celebration and emulation,
but it is also distressing evidence of the extent to which our statutory
scheme has failed to fulfill the promise that was so bright a few
decades ago."9 He concludes, "the common law method will always
be an essential tool for addressing the problems we face." 0 Can
Sax-widely considered as a central figure in the creation of the
modem statutory era of environmental law (a system which Buck
seems to admire)-be a valid straw man for Buck's polemic attacking
the common law? Hardly.
Neither my co-editor nor I suggest that our modem statutory
scheme be ditched for a common-law based system. In fact, we very
carefully stated the opposite:
We wish to be clear, however, that this book is not a call for
dismantling statutory protections and returning to a legal regime that
places primarily reliance on the common law for remedying
environmental harms ..... As experience before the 1970s starkly
illuminates, the common law by itself is incapable of addressing the
multitude of threats to human health, air, water, land, and wildlife
posed by the complex, modem industrial society in which we live.
8 CREATIVE COMMON LAW STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT (Clifford
Rechtschaffen & Denise Antolini, Eds., Enviromnental Law Institute 2007) [hereinafter
CREATIVE COMMON LAW].
9 Joseph L. Sax, Preface, in CREATIVE COMMON LAW, supra note 8.
10 Id.
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Environmental regulation has produced impressed and important
gains in the quality of our environment over the past 35 years. But...
there are still significant gaps in the web of protection woven by
environmental statutes-gaps that can be effectively filled by a
vibrant common law. In short, common law remedies are critically
needed to supplement, not supplant, statutory approaches to
protecting the environment.I
So, there should be a lot of room for Buck and me to agree. If only
we could agree on the right questions. Unfortunately, it is how Buck
provocatively phrases the questions in his essay, and his frequent
resort to a straw man technique, that makes it almost impossible to
find a common ground for a hearty discussion.
For example, on the issue of advocates' allegations of the
"superiority" of the common law compared to agency regulation,' 2
Buck says he is "agnostic"'' 3 but his tone, and in fact his entire essay,
is wholly dismissive of the idea that the common law might have
some advantages. A serious error in Buck's critique is to treat
statutory law and common law as potential legal equivalents. They
simply are not, even if they may have similar goals. As Buck
acknowledges, "[t]o be sure, the fact that the common law can be
tailored to local circumstances can be an advantage. ' 4 That is, in fact,
a key strength of the common law.
To assess if the common law "works," Buck rattles off a series of
rhetorical questions and then seems just to give up, concluding "we
can't agree on what the end is," therefore "we can't agree on how
well the common law achieves a particular end."15 I'm stumped about
why he is stumped. The "end" must surely be protection of the
environment and human health. Even if this is not his personal goal,
and even if we differ greatly on the means to achieve it, we (along
with the host of scholars who have examined the relative value of
common versus statutory law) should be able to agree on this "end."
Moreover, the damning questions Buck poses-such as "Is it simply
to gain the maximal amount of environmental protection, at whatever
cost?"-are not unique to the common law, they are equally
applicable to the statutory world. The macro-level legislative process
is fraught with compromise, balancing, and the influence of "non-
A Roadmap of the Book, in CREATIVE COMMON LAW, supra note 8 (emphasis in
original).
12 Buck, supra note 2.
13 Id. at 630.
4 Id. at 641.
Sld. at 630. His confusion, confusingly, crops up again later: "assuming we could all
agree on what 'up to the task' even means." Id. at 633.
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environmental" values. At the micro-level of common law lawsuits,
the same is true: context is everything. As Buck writes, "It all
depends on the court, the agency, the issue at hand."' 16 But it also
depends on the parties, the motives, the costs, the timing, and the
evidence. And, particularly as common law accretes, on precedent.
Neither approach is pure or simple. Both involve complicated mixes
of law, fact, and politics. The indictment of the common law for these
supposed failings is not warranted.
Buck also complains that "little solid empirical evidence" exists to
support the value of the common law.' 7 So, he concludes, its value
cannot be compared to major statutes like the Clean Water Act. By
oversimplifying the meaning of "empirical" as solely quantitative, he
ignores the value of qualitative (e.g., case-based) "data" that can
inform this discussion. He says "anecdotal evidence only gets you so
far,"' 8 and then sets up his own imaginary three-point test for the
validity of any useful information, stating that it must be
"measurable" data over a twenty-year period with a baseline of
pollution levels.' 9 He adds that, for the data to be good, "[o]f course,
you'd also have to have reliable data for that entire time periodfor all
of the other factors that might affect the levels of pollution,"20 adding
more hurdles to the challenge and setting up a schema that the best
empiricist could never meet. Even very good empirical studies of
statutory law cannot achieve this statistical purity. He says so himself:
"To my knowledge, no one has ever done a study that is remotely like
what I have discussed. And I doubt that anyone can.",21 Indeed. Then,
why set up a surrealistic test? Perhaps his purpose is to make his next
four-part test, adopted from Steven Shavell, seem more appropriate.
This more interesting approach, however, also does not prove his
unprovable point.
With respect to the first part of his modified Shavell test-
knowledge about risky activities-Buck states that the common law
may be better than statutory law because "private parties will
probably have better information than regulators" about risk.22 Here I
agree with Buck, but this is true if one differentiates between a site-
specific problem (which is the typical target of common law) and a
regional or national problem (which is the typical target of statutory
16 Id. at 636.
17 Buck, supra note 2, at 630.
is Id. at 631.
19 Id. at 631-632.
20 Id. at 632 (emphasis added).
21 Id. at 633.
22 Buck, supra note 2, at 633.
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law). In other words, the analysis again requires recognition of the
fundamentally diverse nature of common law cases (largely based on
state common law and filed in state courts) compared to statutes
(primarily federal in the modem environmental scheme used as a
comparison by Buck). (He might argue, and I might agree, that this
distinction does not hold true in the climate change cases. However,
those cases are clearly designed to be catalytic not interstitial, that is,
to prompt policy change as well as seeking to achieve an ultimate
injunctive or damages remedy, which is proving quite elusive.)
When he asks whether common law plaintiffs have superior
information about "general issues of environmental consequences,"
such as "endangered species two states away' 23 the straw man
reappears. Common law cases, even if filed in federal court, are state
law cases involving localized environmental risks. Although some
commentators, including me, hold out hope for a resurgence in
federal common law, I cannot think of a common law case
involving cross-boundary endangered species issues but perhaps I am
mistaken; maybe there are creative litigators pushing this case theory
(and, if so, I would love to know). On the other hand, of course,
cross-boundary species issues are the essence of the federal ESA and
much litigation. So, the very nature of Buck's question provides him
an answer.
His next criticism of common law litigation, that juries are less
capable than regulators in understanding environmental problems, is
quite puzzling. He states, "It seems unlikely that the average jury has
better information than do PhD chemical engineers working for
the EPA. .2. Perhaps Buck's experience as an appellate clerk for
two years has unduly limited his view of how trials really work. He
ignores completely the role of expert witnesses, and the frequent
battle of experts, in cases involving environmental pollution. The
parties are highly motivated to present the best possible quality
information to the jury, and the judge must screen the qualifications
of the experts. Juries are not flying solo, but they do filter the facts
based on their own community experience. Indeed, that is their civic
responsibility. Buck later gets this right: "[b]oth sides can produce
studies and expert testimony, but at the end of the day, the outcome
will depend on which side manages to explain and justify its position
23 Id. at 634.
24 See CREATIVE COMMON LAW, supra note 8, at 47-159 (discussing the Milwaukee I and
H cases).
25 Buck, supra note 2, at 634.
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to an impartial outsider. 26 This is right. But then why the baseless
attack on juries earlier?
What is unclear is whether Buck is arguing that trial, or appellate,
judges are any better at reviewing conflicting expert testimony in the
cold statutory context. Or, if he thinks that agency experts are
necessarily superior to the parties' experts. Quixotically, he criticizes
the very agency experts that he put on a pedestal a few paragraphs
before. He finds that they may be too narrow-minded having put
"their lives and souls into studying a particular type of emissions,"
which "tempt[s them] to regulate it into the ground, while ignoring
the question of whether such regulation is the best use of society's
resources." 27 But Buck admits that even "educated judges" need
environmental cases to be "boiled down into terms" that they can
understand, otherwise "then perhaps the rationale isn't such a good
one. ' 28 Buck's clerkship experience serves him well on point. Law
clerks know particularly well that judges are human too. It may be
that Buck thinks neither juries (in common law cases) nor judges (in
statutory review cases) are competent. But his alternative solution to
providing redress other than these two currently used legal avenues is
not at all evident. Free market? Eliminate legal remedies?
In addressing "ability to pay," Buck argues-without citation,
example, or support-that some polluters may not be able to pay for
the harm they create. 29 He says, "this factor weighs against the
common law."3 ° It does? To the contrary, it seems a stronger
indictment of the market model, which often fails to force
internalization of harmful externalities. He also assumes that polluters
will utterly ignore judgments if they cannot pay (a strange argument
given long-standing judicial mechanisms for enforcing judgments)
but he also dismisses the option of injunctive relief (a primary goal,
for example, in public nuisance cases). This weak criticism may
reflect his unfamiliarity with the world of common law environmental
litigation. In contrast, he seems to think that regulatory approaches
work like a magic wand, "require[ing] the polluter to meet certain
standards from Day One., 31 Even the biggest fans of statutory law
should see the issue in a more complex way. Buck ignores the myriad
real-world problems of permit challenges, non-compliance, non-
enforcement, and the frequent "ability to pay" issues presented in the
26 Id. at 635.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 636.
29 Id.
30 Id.
3' Buck, supra note 2, at 636.
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statutory context. Neither system has a monopoly on efficiency of
enforcement.
On the issue of "access bias" and "process bias," Buck does a
much better job of laying out the difficulties that plaintiffs face in
both the common law and statutory contexts. As he indicates, lack of
initial awareness of the pollution in the first place is a big problem. In
fact, it is an enormous problem. Then, of course, there are the
problems of causation or traceability. These barriers all come back to
haunt statutory plaintiffs particularly in the context of statutory
standing. In the common law context, these plaintiffs may need to
clear the harsh "different in kind" test for public nuisance,32 but under
other theories (such as private nuisance or general negligence), actual
or threatened injury will suffice. Here, Buck shows a finer
appreciation for the general weaknesses of the legal system in
addressing environmental harm.
At bottom, Buck's true concern about the value of the common
law seems to come down to the global warming cases, which he calls
"the prime example of environmental harm that is not likely to be
addressed by common law courts, at least not very well. 33 His dislike
for the global warming cases comes out more colorfully when he
suggests that courts cannot do much about climate change because,
"we all emit carbon in some form, even if only by exhaling. 34 He
then mockingly suggests that the "entire Pacific Rim, as a class,
should sue the entire industrialized world., 35 His facetious suggestion
unfortunately does not add much to our struggle to understand the
role, good or bad, of catalytic environmental common law litigation.
But it may reveal something about the true bogeyman feared by
critics of the common law. The bigger the banana, the bigger the
counter-attack.
As explained by Matt Pawa, one of the key strategists behind the
American Electric Power lawsuits, now pending in the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals,36 the cases were brought in response to the lack of
response from the George W. Bush Administration to the climate
change crisis. Specifically, the public nuisance lawsuit, seeking only
injunctive relief, was filed after the Administration announced it
would not support amendment of the Clean Air Act to impose new
32 See Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public Nuisance: Solving the Paradox of the
Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L. Q. 755 (2001).
33 Id. at 18.
3 Id. at 18.
31 Id. at 18.
36 Matthew Pawa, Global Warming: The Ultimate Public Nuisance, in CREATIVE
COMMON LAW, supra note 8, at 107-63.
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emissions limits on C02, and after the White House disavowed the
Kyoto Protocol.37 Ultimately, the district court dismissed the case sua
sponte on the basis of the political question doctrine. 38 At its core,
even those who disagree with the basis of the district court's dismissal
can agree that this case is fundamentally about whether the courts will
seize the common law opportunity to press forward on solutions, even
partial, to climate change. As Pawa stated, "we have brought to bear
an important additional tool for addressing an environmental problem
of exceptional importance. 39
Similarly, in the similar California common law case addressing
climate change40-but this time seeking damages under a public
nuisance theory-the lead attorney, Ken Alex, viewed the case as a
catalyst for legislative action.4 1 He explained, "[b]oth lawsuits were
carefully crafted by the states' attorneys to respond to failures of the
federal government to address the growing threat of global
warming. 42 California and the other states involved in the cases
"[s]tepp[ed] into that void," and "beg[an] aggressively to seek basic
tort remedies against major sources of [greenhouse gas emissions], in
addition to undertaking their own legislative and regulatory
initiatives., 43 Alex acknowledges that the cases are challenging to the
legal system, but concludes that "[t]he genius of the common law is
its ability to address new pollution problems using long-established
principles validated by decades of judicial precedent to effect
sometimes profound changes."
44
Both of these cases, as well as others more recently filed-such as
the Kivalina case brought by an Alaska Native village of Inupiat
Eskimo under public nuisance theory against two dozen oil, power,
and coal companies, filed in February 2008 45 -show that the common
law will continue to be used by environmental advocates, even if not
always producing an immediate or direct "win," until there is a
sufficient national statutory response to climate change. The very
nature of the common law is to evolve with the times, to adapt to
social needs. Unfortunately, the pace of change arising from these
37 Id. at 124.
38 Id. at 141.
39 Id. at 163.
10 California v. General Motors, et al., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547 (Sept. 17, 2007)
41 Ken Alex, California's Global Warming Lawsuit: The Case for Damages, in CREATIVE
COMMON LAW, supra note 8, at 165-71.
42 Id. at 166.
41 Id. at 166.
44 Id at 171.
41 See Climate Change Threatens Existence, Eskimo Lawsuit Says, http://www.cnn.com/
2008/WORLD/americas/02/26/us.warming.ap/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2008). Matt Pawa is also
on the team of attorneys who brought this lawsuit. Id.
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innovative climate change cases, which not enjoyed a warm welcome
in the courts so far, is glacial. And, for those who seek action on
reducing global greenhouse gas emissions, the window of time for
altering the course of real-world events is simply too short for
ponderous judicial action to succeed on its own. Yet, the climate
change cases are a modem example of the classic role of the common
law.
In conclusion, Buck's essay raises many questions about the
resurgence of "environmental common law' 46 but the wrong ones.
Worse, he answers even many of those questions unsatisfactorily. In
the "Self-Defense Against Fresh Fruit" skit, Cleese progressively kills
each of his recruits while calmly demonstrating how to repel attacks
from bananas and raspberries. Although Buck's essay is not nearly at
lethal, it unfortunately has the same effect of substantially dampening
the reader's interest in even inquiring further about the subtleties of
the weakness and strengths of the common law. Cleese's ultimate
response to the fruit attacks is to unleash a live tiger on his last
remaining recruits. Buck's essay similarly unleashes an untamed
rhetorical critique. Despite the flurry, creative well-grounded
common law strategies will survive for years to come. They will
continue to be an effective supplemental tool to address dangerous
gaps in our modem environmental statutes and to catalyze long over-
due action on governmental policy.
46 CREATIVE COMMON LAW, supra note 8, at 10.
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